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Abstract
Calibration and equal error rates are fundamental criteria of algorithmic fairness that
have been shown to conflict with one another. This paper proves that they can be
satisfied simultaneously in settings where decision-makers use risk scores to assign
binary treatments. In particular, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of calibrated scores that yield classifications achieving equal
error rates. We then present an algorithm that searches for the most informative
score subject to both calibration and minimal error rate disparity. Applied to a
real criminal justice risk assessment, we show that our method can eliminate error
disparities while maintaining calibration. In a separate application to credit lending,
the procedure provides a solution that is more fair and profitable than a common
alternative that omits sensitive features.
1 Introduction
Today’s algorithms reach deep into decisions that guide our lives, from loan approvals to medical
treatments to foster care placements. While they hold the promise of driving social advancements,
making them fair has proven to be challenging both in practice and in theory. Recent work has shown
that even when a dataset is free from bias, an algorithm trained on it will face significant fairness
tradeoffs as long as groups represented in the data have different average outcomes [14, 5, 4, 8, 13].
These fairness impossibility results have underscored the need to target certain criteria of fairness at
the expense of others.
In contrast, this paper presents a natural setting in which it is possible to reconcile two important but
conflicting notions of fairness: calibration and equal error rates. In influential recent work, these two
criteria were proven to be mutually incompatible when both are applied to a risk score [14, 22] and
when both are applied to a classifier [5], suggesting that they may be incompatible altogether [1, 7].
We relax the mathematical tension between these two fairness criteria by enforcing calibration on the
score and equal error rates on the corresponding classifier. In particular, we show that it is possible
to design calibrated scores that yield equal error rate classifications at group-blind cutoffs, and we
provide a method to do so in practice. Modern risk assessments that output scores and classification
recommendations can use the method to satisfy both fairness criteria.
In addition, our framework and method can be applied toward the goal of achieving equal error rates
in human decisions. We consider settings in which a risk score is provided to an accuracy-maximizing
agent, such as a lender, who then uses it to assign binary treatments, such as loan approvals and
denials. We show how to deliver calibrated scores that lead the agent to make the most accurate
classifications that satisfy equal error rates. As a consequence, a creditworthy applicant’s probability
of being granted a loan will not depend on their group affiliation [11].
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A key theme in our analysis is that data richness complements our fairness criteria. On the theoretical
side, we illustrate that the set of attainable error rates grows with the informativeness of the data. In an
empirical application to credit lending, we compare our method to the common practice of omitting
sensitive features from training data and show that it simultaneously achieves higher accuracy and
lower error rate disparity. These results on calibration and equal error rates contribute to growing
evidence that omitting sensitive features can be misguided [9, 10, 6, 16, 13].
Our results proceed as follows. In Section 2, we prove that it is possible to construct calibrated scores
that lead to equal error rate classifications and we precisely characterize when such scores exist. In
Section 3, we propose an algorithm that produces the most accurate possible score satisfying the
fairness criteria and minimizing the decision-maker’s errors. Finally, in Section 4, we apply our
proposed method to two empirical settings. We first assess its performance in helping a lender screen
loan applicants. We then apply the method to the COMPAS criminal risk assessment tool, where we
show that our procedure can eliminate error rate imbalances in risk classifications while preserving
calibration of scores.
2 Theoretical Results
2.1 Formal Setting
Let us consider a triple (Y,X,A) on a common probability space P, where Y ∈ {0, 1} is an outcome
variable, X ∈ Rd is a vector of features, and A ∈ {H,L} is a protected attribute differentiating two
groups with unequal base rates of the outcome,
E[Y |A = L] < E[Y |A = H]. (1)
Our goal is to estimate a score function pˆ ≡ pˆ(X,A) ∈ [0, 1] that predicts Y with maximum accuracy
subject to the fairness constraints of calibration and equal error rates. Specifically, we hand pˆ to a
decision-maker tasked with selecting classifications yˆ ∈ {0, 1} that minimize the loss function
`(yˆ, y) =

0 y = yˆ
1 y > yˆ
k y < yˆ,
(2)
where k > 0 is the relative cost of false positive classifications. Note that any loss function that is
minimized when y = yˆ is equivalent to ` after an affine transformation.
Let us suppose the decision-maker can observe group affiliation A in addition to pˆ. To ensure that
classifications are based only on pˆ and not on A, we constrain pˆ to satisfy calibration within groups,
E[Y |A, pˆ] = E[Y |pˆ] = pˆ. (3)
If (3) holds, the decision-maker’s expected loss given pˆ and A becomes
E[`(Y, yˆ)|pˆ, A] = pˆ(1− yˆ) + k(1− pˆ)yˆ. (4)
This expected loss is minimized with a cutoff decision rule that is independent of group affiliation A,
yˆ = 1{pˆ ≥ p¯}, (5)
where the cutoff p¯ = k/(k+1) is fixed by the decision-maker. Our second fairness condition constrains
yˆ to satisfy equal error rates, ensuring that the classification only depends on the group through the
target variable. Following the decision rule (5), we may write this as
(1{pˆ ≥ p¯} ⊥⊥A) | Y. (6)
Our calibration and equal error rate conditions are summarized by (3) and (6), respectively.
2.2 Relation to Impossibility Results
We first introduce a general impossibility result, relate it to previous work, and show where our
assumptions diverge to make our proposed criteria satisfiable. The following theorem proves that a
single algorithmic output Z cannot generally satisfy notions of both calibration and equal error rates.
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Theorem 1. Let Y,A, and Z be random variables satisfying the following three conditions.
(i) (Y ⊥⊥A) | Z,
(ii) (Z ⊥⊥A) | Y,
(iii) P(A = H|Z), P(Y = 1|A,Z) ∈ (0, 1).
Then A and (Z, Y ) must be independent.
Proof. Suppose that (Y,A,Z) satisfy (i) (ii) and (iii). Assumption (iii) implies that the law of
(A, Y, Z) is strictly positive. By the Hammersley-Clifford theorem (see e.g. [19]), the conditional
independence relations are summarized by a graph on {Y,A,Z} where every path from Y to A
travels through Z, and every path from A to Z travels through Y . There are only two graphs with
this property:
A Z Y
A Z Y
In neither of these graphs does there exist a path from A to (Y,Z), so we conclude that A and (Y, Z)
must be independent for (i) (ii) and (iii) to simultaneously hold.
Note that when A denotes group affiliation and Y denotes outcomes, (i) is a form of calibration
and (ii) is a form of the equal error rate condition. Assumption (iii) is a strong form of predictive
uncertainty that is generalized in the appendix. Thus the theorem shows that when there is predictive
uncertainty and Y depends on A (i.e. when the base rates are unequal), it is impossible for a single
Z to satisfy both calibration and equal error rates. For example, letting Z be a classifier recovers
the Chouldechova [5] result that (i) equal positive and negative predictive values are unachievable
alongside (ii) equal error rates. Meanwhile, letting Z be a risk score shows that (i) calibration is
unachievable alongside (ii) a condition that implies balance in the positive and negative class, similar
to Kleinberg et al. [14].
Our own setting bypasses the mathematical impossibility described in Theorem 1 by imposing
fairness constraints on two separate algorithmic outputs rather than one. We require (i) calibration
from the scores pˆ and (ii) equal error rates from the resulting classifications yˆ = 1{pˆ ≥ p¯}.
2.3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
In this section we characterize exactly when there exists a calibrated pˆ that leads to equal error rate
classifications yˆ at the fixed cutoff p¯. Our conditions can be easily checked in a given setting, and
they are shown to depend on the informativeness of the features X .
The graphical framework in this section builds on methods developed in Hardt et al. [11]. All the
necessary and sufficient conditions will be illustrated inR2, with true positive rates on the vertical axis
and false positive rates on the horizontal. The feasible region will be the space in R2 corresponding
to error rates achievable by an equal error rate classifier yˆ = 1{pˆ ≥ p¯} where pˆ is calibrated.
We first study the entire space of possible equal error rate classifiers, without regard to calibration
or the decision-maker’s cutoff p¯. Then we study the entire space of classifiers that can be based on
cutoff rules p¯ applied to calibrated scores, without regard to the equal error rate condition. Finally,
we assert that the intersection of these two spaces determines fairness feasibility, and we characterize
when the intersection is nonempty.
2.3.1 Classifiers Satisfying Equal Error Rates
We wish to identify the entire space of error rates in R2 achievable by classifiers with equal error rates.
Hardt et al. [11] succeeded in doing so, and we review and adapt their results in this subsection. To
lay the groundwork for the geometric reasoning to follow, we first denote the group A false positive
rate and true positive rate associated with a given classifier yˆ as a point in R2,
α(yˆ, A) =
(
P(yˆ = 1|Y = 0, A), P(yˆ = 1|Y = 1, A)
)
.
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Figure 1: Achievable equal error rates (shaded).
Two pairs of ROC curves form the boundaries of
S(L) and S(H). Points in the intersection S(L)∩
S(H) correspond to equal error rate classifiers.
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Figure 2: Achievable equal error rates from cal-
ibrated score at cutoff p¯ (shaded). The restric-
tions (11) correspond to half-spaces above the red
dashed lines.
We may now define the space of achievable error rates in R2. LetH be the set of all possibly random
classifiers h(X,A). The set of achievable error rates for group A is
S(A) = {α(yˆ, A) | yˆ = h(X,A), h ∈ H} ⊆ R2, (7)
and the set of achievable rates for all classifiers satisfying equal error rates is given by S(L)∩S(H). To
better understand this intersection, we characterize S(A) in terms of Receiver Operator Characteristic
(ROC) curves following Hardt et al. [11]. By definition, an ROC curve of a given score p traces
the true and false positive rates associated with each possible cutoff rule 1{p ≥ c} for c ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore it contains all points α(1{p ≥ c}, A). With these tools in hand, we are ready to characterize
the feasible space of rates S(A) for group A.
Proposition 1. Let p∗ = p∗(X,A) be the Bayes optimal score satisfying p∗ = E[Y |X,A], i.e., the
best score given our data. Then the set of achievable rates S(A) is exactly the convex hull of the
union of the group-A ROC curve of the best score p∗ and the group-A ROC curve of the worst score
1− p∗, i.e. the convex hull of{
α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ c ≤ 1} ∪ {(1, 1)− α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A) ∣∣∣ 0 ≤ c ≤ 1}
Figure 1 illustrates typical examples of S(L), S(H), and the intersection S(L) ∩ S(H) which
represents the rates achievable by equal error rate classifiers.
2.3.2 Classifiers Compatible with Calibration
We now put aside the equal error rate constraint and concentrate on identifying the entire set of
classifiers that are implementable with the cutoff p¯ applied to some calibrated scores pˆ. The set is
characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A classifier yˆ can be written as yˆ = 1{pˆ ≥ p¯} for some calibrated pˆ if and only if its
group-specific positive predictive values exceed p¯, and its group-specific negative predictive values
exceed 1− p¯. In particular, for A ∈ {L,H},
P(Y = 1|yˆ = 1, A) ≥ p¯, P(Y = 0|yˆ = 0, A) > 1− p¯. (8)
Proof. Suppose that yˆ = 1{pˆ ≥ p¯} where pˆ is calibrated. Then yˆ must satisfy the inequalities
P(Y = 1|yˆ = 1, A) = E[Y |pˆ ≥ p¯, A]
= E[pˆ|pˆ ≥ p¯, A] ≥ p¯, (9)
P(Y = 1|yˆ = 0, A) = E[pˆ|pˆ < p¯, A] < p¯. (10)
Therefore, if yˆ is based on a calibrated score pˆ at cutoff p¯, then it is necessary for the group-specific
positive and negative predictive values to exceed p¯ and (1− p¯), respectively.
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Conversely, given any classifier yˆ that satisfies the inequalities (9) and (10), we can always put
pˆ(yˆ, A) = P(Y = 1|yˆ, A)
to obtain a calibrated score that takes just two possible values per group with the cutoff p¯ guaranteed
to be between them. This choice of pˆ thus satisfies yˆ = 1{pˆ ≥ p¯} by construction.
As we will see in the following subsection, this result lays the foundation for the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the satisfiability of our fairness criteria.
2.3.3 The Feasibility Region
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the following are equivalent:
(i) There exists a calibrated score pˆ such that yˆ = 1{pˆ ≥ p¯} satisfies equal error rates.
(ii) There exists a classifier yˆ satisfying equal error rates and (8).
In practice, we propose checking (ii) to identify whether (i) holds. To do so, we use Bayes’ rule to
write (8) as group-specific restrictions on true and false positive rates so that we can consider them in
the same space as the equal error rate constraints given by Hardt et al. [11]. The following theorem
and the accompanying Figure 2 indicates that each restriction (8) corresponds to a half-space in R2,
and that the fairness feasibility region corresponds to the intersection of those half-spaces with each
other and with the equal error rates region S(L) ∩ S(H).
Theorem 2. Let βA = µA/(1 − µA) denote the group-specific odds ratios, with βL < βH . Then
our fairness criteria are simultaneously satisfiable at cutoff p¯ if and only if there exists (α1, α1) ∈
S(L) ∩ S(H) satisfying the two inequalities
α2
α1
≥ p¯
βL(1− p¯) ,
(1− α1)
(1− α2) >
βH(1− p¯)
p¯
(11)
We next provide easily checkable necessary and sufficient conditions for fairness feasibility
Corollary 1. Let (α˘1, α˘2) denote the point at which the inequalities (11) hold with equality. Our
fairness criteria are simultaneously satisfiable at cutoff p¯ if and only if any of the following holds:
α˘1 ≤ 0, α˘1 ≥ 1, or both groups’ ROC curves corresponding to p∗ lie above (α˘1, α˘2). Note that
(α˘1, α˘2) are fixed by the group base rates and decision-maker’s cutoff p¯,
α˘1 =
βL
(βH − βL)
(
βH − (1 + βH) p¯
p¯
)
, α˘2 =
1
(βH − βL)
(
βH (1− p¯)− p¯
1− p¯
)
. (12)
Remark. The ROC curves correspond to the Bayes optimal score p∗ = E[Y |X,A], which needs to
be estimated in practice.
We close the section with a discussion of how data contributes to fairness feasibility, as illustrated by
Theorem 2 and Figure 2. Note that the intersection of the half-spaces defined in (11) are fixed by
given parameters: βL and βH through the population base rates, and p¯ through the decision-maker’s
relative loss k from false positives. If the lines corresponding to those half-spaces intersect between 0
and 1, then what determines fairness feasibility is the height of the ROC curves.
Higher ROC curves correspond to more accurate predictions, which can be achieved by including
more informative features X . This expands the region S(H) ∩ S(L) and thus always weakens
the constraints dictating whether equal error rates and calibration are compatible in a given setting.
Therefore, increasing the quality of data that an algorithm can access promotes our notions of fairness,
whereas removing data compromises them.
3 A Loss-Minimizing Algorithm
After checking that our fairness criteria are feasible in a given setting, a natural next step is to
search for the optimal fair solution, i.e. to identify the most informative score pˆ that minimizes
the decision-maker’s loss subject to our fairness constraints. Our strategy is to first estimate the
most accurate score p∗ = E[Y |X,A] without regard to fairness, and then to use the estimate in two
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separate stages. First, identify the error rates that minimize loss subject to the fairness conditions
(Section 3.1). Second, identify the most informative calibrated pˆ that gives rise to those error rates at
the decision-maker’s cutoff p¯ (Section 3.2). Generalizations of the algorithm are developed in the
appendix and listed at the end of this section.
3.1 Error Rate Optimization
The first stage of the algorithm identifies the achievable error rates that minimize loss. We consider
two formulations. The first minimizes decision-maker loss subject to full enforcement of our fairness
criteria. The second, meanwhile, flexibly accommodates users who seek partial enforcement of the
fairness criteria.
3.1.1 Basic Formulation
Let R denote the set of points (α1, α2) in the feasible region, i.e. the points in S(H) ∩ S(L) that
satisfy (11). Note that R is necessarily convex, as it is the intersection of four convex regions: S(H),
S(L), and the half-spaces satisfying (11). Moreover, according to the decision-maker’s loss function,
the classifier corresponding to (α1, α2) obtains expected loss kα1(1− E[Y ]) + (1− α2)E[Y ]. Thus,
the optimal error rates minimize
`(α1, α2) ≡ kα1(1− E[Y ]) + (1− α2)E[Y ]. (13)
over (α1, α2) ∈ R. The optimal z∗ = (α∗1, α∗2) selected will be on the top-left frontier of the feasible
region in Figure 2, with the precise point on the frontier determined by the decision-maker’s relative
preference k over false positive and false negative classifications.
3.1.2 Flexible Formulation
An alternative formulation featuring a weighted error-rate penalty can accommodate multiple cases
encountered in practice. Users can flexibly trade off fairness and accuracy objectives, minimize error
disparities rather than eliminate them when the feasible region R is empty, and enforce just one error
constraint as in the “equality of opportunity” criterion of [11].
First we define a broader domain for the algorithm to search over in place of R. It contains all the
error rates implementable by a calibrated score at the decision-maker’s cutoff, without regard to equal
error rates. The domain is R(H)×R(L) where
R(A) =
{
(α1, α2) ∈ S(A)
∣∣∣∣ 1− α21− α1 < p¯/βA(1− p¯) ≤ α2α1
}
.
We also replace the loss function (13). The generalized loss function takes group-specific error rates
zA = (α1A, α2A) and outputs a weighted sum of the decision-maker’s expected loss from those rates
and the disparities across them. The loss is
γ`(zL) + (1− γ)`(zH) + (zL − zH)′Λ(zL − zH) (14)
where `(zA) is the decision-maker’s expected loss kα1A(1− E[Y |A]) + (1− α2A)E[Y |A] and γ is
the fraction of individuals in group L. Meanwhile, Λ is a positive semidefinite matrix that provides
the flexibility of varying the enforcement of error rate minimization. For example, taking Λ = λI for
arbitrarily large λ recovers the equal error rate solution when the feasible region R is nonempty, and
otherwise outputs the solution that minimizes error rate disparities. Meanwhile a small choice of λ
places relatively more weight on accuracy.
Finally, Λ could be chosen so that differences in the true and false positive rates are weighted
differently. For example, we can achieve equal true positive rates [11] by letting Λ(2, 2) be large and
assigning 0 to all other elements in Λ.
As a result of the flexible procedure, group-specific error rates z∗L and z
∗
H are chosen to minimize the
generalized loss function (14). In the second stage of the algorithm, discussed next, users can identify
a calibrated score that yields those target rates at the decision-maker’s classification cutoff.
3.2 Risk Score Optimization
Once a feasible set of error rates is chosen, the decision-maker’s expected loss is determined. However,
multiple choices of calibrated scores may be compatible with those target rates at the cutoff p¯, and we
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expect that in practice, decision-makers would prefer using the most informative scores. This section
thus describes a method to recover the MSE-minimizing score pˆ that implements the target rates z∗L
and z∗H by solving a constrained optimal transport problem [21].
We base the method on the observation that the best fair pˆ is recoverable through post-processing
the Bayes optimal score p∗ = E[Y |X,A]. Hardt et al. [11] also justify post-processing in their
development of an algorithm achieving equal error rate classifiers, and we adapt their argument to our
setting in the appendix. We also discuss how our procedure can be thought of as finding the smallest
mean-preserving contraction of p∗ that yields the targeted error rates. Readers may note that this
involves some randomization of scores. We explore the effects of the randomization empirically in
our appendix, and meanwhile highlight that our algorithm’s accuracy objective limits the extent to
which scores change.
Our method defines one linear program per group A and seeks the most informative pˆA such that
α(1{pˆA ≥ p¯}, A) = z∗A = (α∗1A, α∗2A).
For the remainder of the section, we simplify notation by suppressing A subscripts and note that the
procedure is performed once for each group A ∈ {H,L}.
Our approach will involve a transformation kernel that maps the distribution of the most accurate p∗ to
the distribution of our post-processed pˆ. We assume for simplicity (with justification in the appendix)
that p∗ is discrete and takes N ordered values p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ), each with probability mass
given by s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) where
∑
i si = 1. Furthermore, we will denote the post-processed pˆ
as taking those same discrete values p but with different probability masses that we seek to optimize,
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fN ).
We call T the matrix that maps probability masses from the discrete distribution of p∗ to that of pˆ. In
particular, with probability Tij , the kernel will map an individual with score pi to the output score pj .
Therefore, the probability distribution of pˆ will be determined by
T ′s = f. (15)
In order to produce probability distributions, T must be right-stochastic: elements must take values
between 0 and 1, and each row should sum to 1.
0 ≤ Tij ≤ 1 and
N∑
k=1
Tik = 1 ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . N}. (16)
According to our fairness criteria, we further constrain T . To ensure that pˆ will be calibrated, we
need the outcome of individuals assigned score fi to satisfy Y = 1 with probability pi. Assuming
that p∗ is itself calibrated (relaxed in the appendix), this reduces to
N∑
i=1
Tijpisi = pjfj ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (17)
The targeted false- and true-positive rates (α∗1, α
∗
2) derived in Section 3.1 similarly require:
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Tijpisi (1{pj ≥ p¯} − α∗2) = 0,
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Tij(1− pi)si (1{pj ≥ p¯} − α∗1) = 0. (18)
Finally, we formulate an objective. Note that the mean-squared error of pˆ satisfies the bias-variance
decomposition
E[(pˆ− Y )2] = E[(pˆ− E[Y |X,A])2] + E[(Y − E[Y |X,A])2],
and thus the pˆ that minimizes the left hand side is obtained by minimizing the first term on the
right hand side. In particular, if the input score p∗ is E[Y |X,A], then the post-processed score that
minimizes mean-squared error will also minimize
E[(pˆ− p∗)2] =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Tij(pi − pj)2si. (19)
Furthermore, even if p∗ is not exactly equal to E[Y |X,A], the triangle inequality in L2(P) implies
E[(pˆ− Y )2] 12 ≤ E[(p∗ − Y )2] 12 + E[(pˆ− p∗)2] 12 .
Thus, by minimizing the objective (19) we can effectively control the additional error due to post-
processing. Combining this with the above constraints yields a straightforward linear program.
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Figure 3: Evaluating algorithm performance. In each figure, maroon represents the high-mean group
while blue represents the low-mean group. Panel (a) corresponds to credit lending, illustrating the
empirical ROC curves from the rich feature set (opaque) and the limited feature set (translucent).
Panels (b) and (c) cover the criminal justice application, showing respectively that we can eliminate
error rate disparities and maintain score calibration. Note that we define a true positive classification
as correctly identifying someone who would not reoffend.
3.3 Available Generalizations
Interested readers are invited to reference the appendix for further discussion of this algorithm and
additional generalizations. The procedure is shown to handle cases where the decision-maker’s cutoff
p¯ is estimated with error and where there are more than two groups.
4 Empirical Results
Let us take our procedure to data. In the first application, we design a risk score to aid a lender’s
classification task to authorize loans, showing that it outperforms a common alternative strategy
based on the omission of sensitive features. Afterwards, we build on the criminal justice algorithm
COMPAS to demonstrate that risk assessments can be designed to output both calibrated risk scores
as well as equal error rate binary risk summaries. Detailed discussion of each example is included in
our appendix for interested readers.
4.1 Predicting loan repayment
We first present an example of designing a risk score to inform a credit lenders approvals of loan
applicants. Our predictions are constructed using the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), a nationally-representative survey of the civilian population spanning multiple years [23]. We
select as our outcome the ability to pay rent, mortgage, and utilities in 2016, and suppose that we are
tasked with predicting that outcome using survey responses from two years prior. Furthermore we
assume that the lender regards missed payments as highly costly and accordingly authorizes loans
only to those with scores greater than p¯ ≈ .909, corresponding to k = 10. Our goal is to design
scores that treat high-educated and low-educated applicants fairly, so that creditworthy individuals
will have the same probability of being granted a loan regardless of their education.
The full dataset contains over 1,800 features spanning detailed financial variables (including work
history, assets, and debts), as well as sensitive features (including demographic information). We
apply our algorithm to the full feature set and derive calibrated scores that yield equal true positive
rates at the lender’s cutoff. Then, we compare its performance to an accuracy-maximizing algorithm
that uses the commonly practiced fairness strategy of omitting all sensitive features from the training
data. The results are summarized numerically in Table 1 and graphically in Figure 3a. Our algorithm
simultaneously achieves lower loss for the lender as well as higher probabilities that creditworthy
applicants of both education groups are granted loans.
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Table 1: Application to credit lending. Row [1] is based on raw scores. Row [2] summarizes the
classifier that minimizes lender loss subject to equal true positive rates. Our algorithm summarized in
row [3] produces a calibrated score corresponding to equal true positive rate classifications; since it
retrieves the same error rates as row [2], we see there is no added loss from enforcing score calibration.
Row [4] summarizes the scores from the alternative procedure that omits sensitive features, displaying
greater loss for the lender, lower true positive rates for both groups, and substantial error disparities
across groups.
Algorithmic Target Lender Loss TPR (H/L) FPR (H/L) Score MSE
Trained on all features
[1] Accuracy Maximizing .517 (.795/.661) (.341/.255) .072
[2] Eq. TPR Only .532 (.727/.727) (.299/.339) N/A
[3] *Eq. TPR + Calibration* .532 (.727/.727) (.299/.339) .073
Trained on limited features
[4] Accuracy Maximizing .591 (.603/.518) (.202/.230) .077
4.2 Predicting criminal recidivism
In a second application, our procedure can design risk assessments that output both calibrated scores
as well as binary high or low risk summaries satisfying equal error rates. To illustrate, we consider
the COMPAS criminal justice algorithm. In 2016, ProPublica reported that the algorithms risk
summaries displayed substantial error imbalances across race, although the algorithms scores satisfied
predictive parity overall [2, 1].
To check whether we can correct COMPAS error imbalances without sacrificing score calibration, we
applied our post-processing technique to Broward County risk scores made public by ProPublica
[17]. Motivated by ProPublica’s influential analysis [18], we define the outcome as the measure of
recidivism within two years, and suppose that all defendants with scores 1 through 4 are flagged to a
judge as “low” risk, while those from 5 to 10 are flagged as “high.” We derived the associated ROC
curves of the scores, as seen in Figure 3b. Our procedure eliminates the racial error disparities of the
associated risk classifications. As seen in Figure 3c, it also preserves calibration.
5 Conclusion
In settings from hospitals to courtrooms, decision-makers stand to benefit from algorithmic predictions.
This paper studies fair prediction in the widespread setting where a risk score is constructed to aid
their classification tasks. We prove that it is possible to construct calibrated scores that lead to equal
error rate classifications at group-blind cutoffs. We characterize exactly when a solution is possible
and propose an algorithm that produces the most informative score satisfying the fairness criteria and
minimizing the decision-makers errors. Finally, we emphasize the importance of data richness to
fairness. Compared to a commonly practiced strategy of omitting sensitive data, our algorithm can
produce scores that enhance both efficiency and equity.
6 Thoughts on Broader Impact
Today’s algorithmic risk scores form the basis for decisions that directly impact people. Risk scores
can determine whether a child welfare official opens an abuse investigation into a family, whether
a physician enrolls a patient into a treatment program, whether a judge chooses the grant bail to a
defendant, and whether a lender authorizes a mortgage for a family seeking to buy a home. In this
paper, we have sought to expand the range of tools available to the developers of these modern risk
assessments.
There are two sets of scenarios where our work can be applied, depending on whether it is a risk
assessment or a third-party decision-maker that is responsible for deriving classifications. The first
case accommodates a risk assessment tool similar to COMPAS that displays to its user both a risk
score as well as a corresponding high or low risk summary for each individual. Our procedure could
be used to produce calibrated scores that, at a designated cutoff chosen by the developer, correspond
to binary summaries satisfying equal error rates.
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In the second set of possible applications, our procedure can produce calibrated risk scores for
a decision-maker tasked with assigning binary treatments, such as authorizing or denying loans
[15, 12]. For the procedure to successfully induce equal error rate outcomes, knowledge is required
about how the decision-maker weighs the costs of false positive and negative classifications. That is,
collaboration with the decision-maker during the design process is crucial.
When considering the social implications of this work, we emphasize that the two fairness criteria that
we have focused on here do not encompass all notions of fairness. Tradeoffs remain between these
criteria and others. For example, enforcing equal error rates requires that the classifications positive
and negative predictive values will be unequal across groups, meaning that one groups scores would
carry greater signal to the decision-maker than the others [5]. Perhaps more importantly, equal error
rate classifications will generically require changes to the Bayes optimal classifications that favor
certain groups, and enforcing calibration does not diminish this requirement. Relatedly, implementing
equal error rates across one group identifier can sometimes cause imbalances across other group
identifiers [6].
We believe that every prediction setting warrants individualized fairness assessments and a tailored
approach. The choice of how to prioritize fairness conditions is ultimately up to human beings. We
hope that by clarifying the precise relationship between two influential criteria, we can facilitate these
decisions, and that in settings where calibration and equal error rates are considered essential, our
algorithm can help yield accurate predictions and fairer outcomes.
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Appendix for Section 2
Omitted proofs in 2.2
Addendum to Theorem 1
Addendum. We relax condition (iii) of Theorem 1 and replace it with the weaker condition that
Var(Y |Z) >  almost surely. This will correspond to the assumption that Y cannot be perfectly
predicted from any realization of Z. We will make use of the criterion that Borel random variables R
and R′ are independent conditional on Σ iff for all bounded, continuous f and g we have
E[f(R)g(R′)|Σ] = E[f(R)|Σ]E[g(R′)|Σ].
Now suppose that (Z,A, Y ) are known to satisfy Theorem 1 conditions (i) and (ii), and that
Var(Y |Z) > 0. Then let η be a Ber(ε) random variable independent of (Z,A, Y ). We consider
a variable Aη that takes value A with probability 1 − ε and otherwise flips the variable A with
probability ε, that is,
Aη = A+ η (mod 2).
This gives us a triple (Z,Aη, Y ) that satisfies E[A|Z] ∈ (0, 1) and E[Y |A,Z] ∈ (0, 1) almost surely
by construction, corresponding to condition (iii) from the Theorem. We can also show that the triple
satisfies the other two conditions. For instance, to show that condition (i) holds, let S be an arbitrary
set such that S ∈ σ(Z). We will use the fact that any σ(Z)-measurable random variable V and any
random variable U satisfy E[E[U |Z]V ] = E[UV ]. In particular, because 1Z∈S is σ(Z)-measurable.
E [E[f(Aη)g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] = E [f(Aη)g(Y )1Z∈S ]
= E(A,Z,Y ) [Eη[f(Aη)]g(Y )1Z∈S ] by independence of η
= E(A,Z,Y ) [E[Eη[f(Aη)]g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] since 1Z∈S is σ(Z)-measurable
= E(A,Z,Y ) [E[Eη[f(Aη)]|Z]E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] by assumption that (Y ⊥⊥A) | Z
= E(A,Z,Y ) [Eη[f(Aη)]E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] by independence of η
= E [f(Aη)E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ]
= E [E[f(Aη)|Z]E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S ] since E[g(Y )|Z]1Z∈S is σ(Z)-measurable.
Because S was arbitrary and bothE[f(Aη)|Z]E[g(Y )|Z] andE[f(Aη)g(Y )|Z] are σ(Z)-measurable,
we can conclude that E[f(Aη)|Z]E[g(Y )|Z] = E[f(Aη)g(Y )|Z] almost surely so (i) is satisfied. A
very similar argument shows that (ii) holds. Therefore, by Theorem 1, Aη is independent of (Z, Y ).
Then given arbitrary bounded and continuous functions f and g,
E[f(Aη)g(Z, Y )] = E[f(Aη)]E[g(Z, Y )].
Using the fact that Aη → A as η ↓ 0 in L2(P), and that h 7→ E[h] and (h, h′) 7→ E[hh′] are
continuous in L2(P), we conclude by continuity that
E[f(A)g(Z, Y )] = E[f(A)]E[g(Z, Y )].
Since f and g were arbitrary, we have in fact shown that A is independent of (Z, Y ), as wanted.
Thus, we have succeeded in proving the following refinement: under Theorem 1 assumptions (i) and
(ii), if Y cannot be perfectly predicted from any realization of Z, then the random variables A and
(Y, Z) must be independent.
Since assumptions (i) and (ii) continue to hold if we condition on Z ∈ S for any S, we can say further
that if Theorem 1 conditions (i) and (ii) hold and P is the set of values of Z from which perfect
prediction is not possible, i.e. Var(Y |Z) > 0 then A and Y are independent conditionally on Z ∈ P .
Omitted proofs in 2.3.1
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First we can prove a lemma stating that S(A) is convex. To see this, let ξ be an independent
Ber(λ) random variable. Then, by iterating expectations, one sees that
α(yˆ + ξ(zˆ − yˆ), A) = λα(zˆ, A) + (1− λ)α(yˆ, A).
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Using this convexity, we can prove the proposition. Note that the points α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A) that make
up the group-A ROC curve of p∗ describe the error rates achieved by all cutoff classifiers based on
p∗, and so they are in S(A). Meanwhile, since
α(1− yˆ, A) = (1, 1)− α(yˆ, A),
the points (1, 1)− α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A) must also be in S(A). This corresponds to the group-A ROC
curve of the scores 1− p∗. Any point in the convex hull of these two ROC curves can be achieved by
randomization as in the aforementioned lemma. For further details and intuition, see Section 4 in
Hardt et al. (2016). Note that Hardt et al. choose not to illustrate the feasible region below the main
diagonal as it corresponds to classifiers that are worse than random.
To show that all attainable error rates belong to this set, we use the convexity of S(A) to note that the
support points of S(A) correspond to all classifiers that yield extrema of γ1α1(yˆ, A) + γ2α2(yˆ, A)
where (γ1, γ2) are arbitrary weights. To describe these support points tractably, we can use the result
derived later in the appendix (Proposition A.3) that shows that optimal classifications can be chosen
to depend on only p∗ and A, where p∗ = E[Y |X,A]. Thus the extrema of γ · α(yˆ, A) are achieved
by cutoff rules f(p∗, A) = 1{p∗ ≥ c} and f(p∗, A) = 1{p∗ < c}, giving support points
α(1{p∗ ≥ c}, A)
and
α(1{p∗ < c}, A) = (1, 1)− 1{p∗ ≥ c}, A)
which as we have shown are all contained in S(A). Finally, we use the fact that a convex set
containing all of its support points is equal to the convex hull of its support points.
Omitted proofs in 2.3.3
Extension of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that (i) holds and call pˆf the fair score for which yˆ = 1{pˆf ≥ p¯} satisfies equal error
rates. Then since pˆf is calibrated,
P(Y = 1|yˆ = 1, A) = E[Y |pˆf ≥ p¯, A] =
= E[pˆf |pˆf ≥ p¯, A] ≥ p¯
and similarly,
P(Y = 1|yˆ = 0, A) < p¯
So in addition to satisfying equal error rates, yˆ satisfies (9) and (10), which are equivalent to the two
conditions in (8). Thus (ii) is a necessary condition for fairness.
Now we show the converse; (ii) is also sufficient for fairness. Suppose that (ii) holds and let yˆf be a
classifier satisfying equal error rates and (8). Choose pˆ(yˆf , A) = P(Y = 1|yˆf , A). These scores are
calibrated by construction. Also, since they satisfy pˆ(yˆf = 0, A) < p¯ and pˆ(yˆf = 1, A) ≥ p¯, they
exactly implement the classifier yˆf at the cutoff p¯.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Building on the above extension of Proposition 2, it is enough for us to show that the existence
of the point (α1, α2) ∈ S(L) ∩ S(H) satisfying (11) is equivalent to the following: There exists a
classifier yˆ satisfying equal error rates and (8).
First note that S(L) ∩ S(H) is nonempty, since for example (0, 0) and (1, 1) are points in both
S(L) and S(H). So we can consider some arbitrary (α1, α2) that is in S(L) ∩ S(H) and is
therefore implementable by an equal error rate classifier that we call yˆe. We need to show that yˆe
satisfying the conditions in (8) ∀A is equivalent to its corresponding true and false positive rates
(α1(yˆe, A), α2(yˆe, A)) satisfying (11) ∀A.
Recall that the PPV condition in (8) required
P(Y = 1|yˆe = 1, A) ≥ p¯.
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Applying Bayes’ rule to the inequality, we have
P(Y = 1|yˆe = 1, A) = P(yˆe = 1|Y = 1, A)P(Y = 1|A)P(yˆe = 1|A)
=
α2(yˆe, A)µA
α2(yˆe, A)µA + α1(yˆe, A)(1− µA)
≥ p¯
After algebraic manipulation, the restriction can be written
α2(yˆe, A)
α1(yˆe, A)
≥ p¯(1− µA)
(1− p¯)µA =
p¯
(1− p¯)βA
where βA ≡ µA/(1−µA). Therefore (α1(yˆe, A), α2(yˆe, A)) must satisfy the following for both A = L
and A = H
α2(yˆe, A)
α1(yˆe, A)
≥ p¯
(1− p¯)βA
Since βL < βH , the condition is more restrictive when A = L, giving the first condition in (11). We
next similarly transform the NPV condition in (8), recalling it requires
P(Y = 0|yˆ = 0, A) > 1− p¯
and by Bayes’ rule,
P(Y = 0|yˆ = 0, A) = P(yˆ = 0|Y = 0, A)P(Y = 0|A)
P(yˆ = 0|A)
=
(1− α1(yˆ, A))(1− µA)
(1− α1(yˆ, A))(1− µA) + (1− α2(yˆ, A))µA
> 1− p¯
After algebraic manipulation, this becomes ∀A
(1− α1(yˆ, A))
(1− α2(yˆ, A)) >
(1− p¯)βA
p¯
Since βH > βL, the most restrictive case is when A = H , giving the second condition in (11).
Note that special attention should be given to the corner solutions. At point (0, 0), the first condition
in (11) becomes irrelevant and so the second condition in (11) is necessary and sufficient. Meanwhile
at (1, 1), the second condition in (11) becomes irrelevant so the first condition in (11) is necessary
and sufficient.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Let F and G denote the lines for which the inequalities (11) hold with equality. That is to say,
F,G ⊂ R2 are given by
F =
{
(α1, α2) ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣ α2α1 = p¯βL(1− p¯)
}
G =
{
(α1, α2) ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣ (1− α1)(1− α2) = βH(1− p¯)p¯
}
The lines intersect at (α˘1, α˘2) given by (12). Our proof will rest on a few basic facts: S(L) ∩ S(H)
is convex, F contains (0, 0), G contains (1, 1), and both lines have positive slope.
First we prove that if α˘1 ≤ 0, α˘1 ≥ 1, or both ROC curves lie above the intersection (α˘1, α˘2), then
there exists a point (α1, α2) satisfying the feasibility conditions in Theorem 2.
Case I: 0 < α˘1 < 1 and (α˘1, α˘2) lies below both ROC curves. Note that increasing α2 slackens
both inequalities (11). Thus, if 0 < α˘1 < 1 and (α˘1, α˘2) lies below both ROC curves, there then
exists a point (α˘1, α2) with α2 > α˘2 that lies on the minimum of the two ROC curves, hence in
S(H) ∩ S(L), and moreover the inequalities (11) hold at (α˘1, α2). This is a feasible point.
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Case II: α˘1 ≤ 0. On the other hand, if α˘1 ≤ 0, then in (0, 1)× R the line F lies strictly above G.
Then the point (0, 0) ∈ S(L) ∩ S(H) ∩ F lies above G, meaning that the second condition in (11)
holds and the point is feasible.
Case III: α˘1 ≥ 1. If α˘1 ≥ 1, then in (0, 1) × R the line G lies strictly above F . Then the point
(1, 1) ∈ S(L) ∩ S(H) ∩G lies above F , so the first condition in (11) holds and the point is feasible.
Finally, we prove the converse that if 0 < α˘1 < 1 and α˘2 lies above at least one of the ROC
curves, then the feasible region is empty. Let the intersection of S(L) ∩ S(H) with the half-space
above F be denoted by IF , and the intersection of S(L) ∩ S(H) with the half-space above G be
denoted by IG. We need to show that IF ∩ IG is empty. The argument follows from the convexity of
S(L) ∩ S(H) and the fact that both F and G have positive slopes. In particular, due to the convexity
of S(L) ∩ S(H), the positive slope of F , and the fact that (0, 0) is in F , we know the line F must
intersect the boundary of S(L) ∩ S(H) strictly to the left of α˘1. Meanwhile, G must intersect the
boundary of S(L) ∩ S(H) strictly to the right of α˘1. Thus the rightmost point of IF lies strictly to
the left of the leftmost point of IG, and the intersection of S(L) ∩ S(H) with both half-spaces above
F and G must be empty.
Appendix for Section 3
Justification for post-processing p∗
First we justify post-processing the Bayes optimal p∗ to arrive at the optimal fair pˆ. To do so we
adapt Proposition 5.2 from Hardt et al. (2016) to our setting and prove the following
Proposition A.3. For any source distribution over (Y,X,A) with Bayes optimal regressor given by
p∗(X,A) = E[Y |X,A] and loss function `, there exists a predictor pˆ(p∗, A) such that
(i) pˆ is an optimal predictor satisfying our fairness properties of calibration and equal error
rates. That is, E[`(1pˆ>p, Y )] ≤ E[`(1gˆ>p, Y )] for any gˆ that satisfies the properties.
(ii) pˆ is derived from (p∗, A). In particular, it is a (possibly random) function of the random
variables (p∗, A) alone, and is independent of X conditional on (p∗, A).
Proof. To start, first note that our fairness properties of calibration and equal error rates on a score p
and classifications 1{p ≥ p¯} are “oblivious.” That is, they depend only on the joint distribution of
(Y,A, p) given the known cutoff p¯. We will show that for any arbitrary gˆ that satisfies the fairness
properties, we can construct a pˆ that also satisfies fairness, yields the same expected loss, and is
derived from (p∗, A).
Consider an arbitrary gˆ = f(X,A) satisfying the fairness properties. We can define pˆ(p∗, A) as
follows: draw a vector X ′ independently from the conditional distribution of X given the realized
values of p∗ and A, and set pˆ = f(X ′, A). Note this pˆ satisfies (ii) by construction.
To show that this pˆ satisfies the fairness properties and yields the same expected loss as gˆ, note
that since Y is binary with conditional expectation equal to the Bayes optimal p∗, we know Y is
independent of X conditional on p∗. Therefore (Y, p∗, X,A) and (Y, p∗, X ′, A) have the same joint
distribution, and so must (f(X,A), A, Y ) and (f(X ′, A), A, Y ). Since the fairness properties are
oblivious and depend only on these latter joint distributions, then we know that as long as gˆ satisfies
them then so will pˆ. Finally, we can deduce that (Y, gˆ) and (Y, pˆ) also have the same joint distribution,
meaning that (i) is satisfied with equality.
Mean-preserving contractions of calibrated scores
We observe that a calibrated score derived from another is a mean-preserving contraction. Since the
Bayes optimal p∗ that serves as input to our algorithm frequently satisfies calibration (see Liu et
al. 2019), then our post-processing method can be viewed as finding its smallest mean preserving
contraction that achieves equal error rates at the decision-maker’s cutoff.
The relationship between calibrated scores related by post-processing is characterized by our proposi-
tion below.
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Proposition A.4. Let pA be any calibrated score of group A, i.e. satisfying E[Y |pA] = pA for
members of A, and let pˆA = f(pA, ζ) be a score post-processed from pA that is also calibrated,
where ζ is independent of Y conditional on pA. Then, pˆA is a mean-preserving contraction of
pA, with pA = pˆA + Z and E[Z|pˆA] = 0. Conversely, any p˜A that satisfies pA = p˜A + Z with
E[Z|p˜A] = 0 is calibrated.
Proof. We first show that pˆA is a mean-preserving contraction of pA. To start, note that the post-
processed pˆA is assumed to be calibrated, so E[Y |pˆA] = pˆA. Moreover, since pˆA = f(pA, ζ), we
have σ(pˆA) ⊆ σ(pA, ζ). Therefore by the tower property of conditional expectation,
pˆA = E[Y |pˆA]
= E[E[Y |pA, ζ]|pˆA]
= E[E[Y |pA]|pˆA] by conditional independence of ζ
= E[pA|pˆA] by calibration of pA
Then pA = pA+(pˆA−E[pA|pˆA]) = pˆA+(pA−E[pA|pˆA]) where the second term is by construction
mean independent of pˆA, so pˆA is a mean-preserving contraction of pA.
Now we show that if the score p˜A is a mean-preserving contraction of pA such that pA = p˜A +Z for
some Z satisfying E(Z|p˜A) = 0, then p˜A is calibrated. Observe that
E[pA|p˜A] = E[p˜A + Z|p˜A]
= E[p˜A|p˜A] + E[Z|p˜A]
= p˜A
which is sufficient to show that P˜A is calibrated. To see why, recall that pA is calibrated and note that
by the tower property of conditional expectation with σ(p˜A) ⊆ σ(pA),
E[pA|p˜A] = E[E(Y |pA)|p˜A] = E[Y |p˜A]
Justification for discretizing p∗
Our algorithm uses the discretization of p∗ to construct a linear program that maps probability masses
from p∗ to pˆ. Note that even if the original p∗ is not discrete, it can easily be discretized into N bins
by taking
p′ = bNp∗c/N.
Note that the discretized score will satisfy |p′ − p∗| ≤ N−1 almost surely, so for large values of N ,
the discretization p′ well-approximates p∗.
Generalizing algorithm when p∗ is not calibrated
The algorithm can be easily adapted for cases when the most accurate available estimate of p∗ is not
calibrated within groups. Part 1 of the algorithm (Section 3.1) remains unchanged as well as the need
to perform Part 2 (Section 3.2) separately for each group A. But for each run of Part 2, a vector q
needs to be computed from the discretized p∗ and three constraints updated as follows.
For each discretized score assignment pi of p∗, define qi as the mean outcome of group-A individuals
assigned pi, i.e. qi = E[Y |p∗ = pi, A]. Then denote the vector of these conditional means as
q = (q1, q2, . . . , qN ). Once q is computed, the core of the Part 2 algorithm is unchanged. We are still
mapping the distribution s from the discretized scores p∗ to the distribution f of the new fair score pˆ.
However, we now use q in the following constraints that replace 17 and 18:
N∑
i=1
Tijqisi = pjfj ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (A.20)
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Tijqisi (1{pj ≥ p¯} − α2) = 0 (A.21)
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Tij(1− qi)si (1{pj ≥ p¯} − α1) = 0 (A.22)
17
Generalizing algorithm given an interval of possible k or p¯
In settings where the exact p¯ is unknown or not fixed, our algorithm can be adapted for an interval of
possible cutoffs (p¯− , p¯+ ). The generalized version produces scores pˆ that are either below p¯− 
or above p¯+ , so that any cutoff in the interval would execute the same classifications.
In particular, we propose a couple modifications to generalize our algorithm to this setting. We wish
for anyone receiving scores above p¯+  to be classified as yˆ = 1 and anyone receiving scores below
p¯ −  as yˆ = 0. Following the reasoning in Proposition 2, for such a score to be calibrated, the
associated PPV should exceed p¯+  and the NPV exceed 1− (p¯− ). Therefore, the feasible region
previously defined in Theorem 2 by 11 is now defined by
α2
α1
≥ p¯+ 
βL(1− (p¯+ )) (A.23)
(1− α1)
(1− α2) >
βH(1− (p¯− ))
p¯−  (A.24)
We also add a constraint to the scoring algorithm, specifying that no post-processed scores be assigned
values inside the interval of possible cutoffs:
Tik = 0 ∀k such that pk ∈ (p¯− , p¯+ ) (A.25)
The rest of the procedure remains unchanged. The cost of the added flexibility is a tighter feasible
region and higher MSE of the final score.
Generalizing algorithm when there are more than two groups
This algorithm can be adapted to achieve the fairness criteria for multiple groups across multiple
identifiers. First identify each unique group in A.
The feasible set of error rates is then all points in the intersection of each group’s set S(A) satisfying
the inequalities (11) where H is the highest-mean group and L is the lowest-mean group. Then, as in
Section 3.1, find the decision-maker’s favored set of error rates in that feasible region.
Finally, for each group, separately implement the linear program in Section 3.2.
Appendix for Section 4: Credit Lending
Raw data and cleaning
Our empirical application is based on public data collected and made available by the U.S. Census
Bureau, specifically the 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation 1. We converted the
datasets from Waves 2 and 4 to CSV format and then organized them to serve our prediction task:
use features in Wave 2 to predict reported repayment ability in Wave 4.
We matched every adult from the Wave 2 survey who responded to the Wave 4 survey and dropped
the non-responders. We used education reported in Wave 2 to distinguish two groups L and H
(representing 44% and 56% of the population respectively), L who attained at most a high school
education and H who attained more. We randomly allocated 30% of all observations to a test set
(about 8,000 adults) and the remaining 70% to a training set (about 18,000 adults).
Our outcome was the respondents’ ability to pay mortgage, rent, and utilities in every month tracked
in 2016 according to Wave 4. Any adult who failed to pay mortgage, rent, and/or utilities in any
month was assigned label Y = 0, and otherwise assigned Y = 1. Base rates differed across groups;
11% of the less-educated group missed a payment compared to only 7% of the higher-educated group.
Finally, we constructed two sets of features. The first was based on rich data, comprising virtually
all available variables from the Wave 2 survey but dropping those with no variation in the training
set (leaving over 2,000 in total). The second was based on limited data, where we hand-selected
“non-sensitive” variables involving assets, debts, income, and employment (over 800 in total).
1https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/data/datasets.html
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We identified which features were categorical and performed one-hot encoding. Then we standardized
all features by centering them at 0 and dividing by their feature-specific standard deviations from the
training set.
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Figure A.4: Credit lending calibration plots. Panel A.4a depicts discretized pre-processed scores on
the horizontal axis, with the portion in each bin paying their bills plotted on the vertical axis (including
standard errors). Panel A.4b depicts the calibration of post-processed scores. Our procedure is seen
to preserve calibration.
Deriving our empirical results
In deriving our empirical results, we employed the following protocol. As an initial step we estimated
the original scores p∗ with LASSO where the penalty parameters were tuned using 10-fold cross
validation in the training dataset. We then tuned and evaluated the post-processing procedure in the
test dataset. This consisted of the following steps.
1. We compute a discrete approximation to the score distribution of p∗ for each group using the
numpy.histogram Python method. This involves setting the user-defined hyperparameter
N for the number of bins. We produced all results with the specification N = 50. We
also tried N = 10, 15, 25, 100, 250, which did not appear to change results significantly.
For N = 500, 1000, results also did not change significantly but the running time was
significantly longer.
2. Next we calibrate the discrete approximation to the data by replacing the score assigned to
each bin with the average outcome.
3. We use the calibrated and discretized scores to compute group-specific ROC curves using
the scikitlearn.metrics.roc curve function, and then compute the calibration com-
patibility constraints, assuming k = 10 =⇒ p¯ = 1011 . These determine the feasible region
R(H)×R(L).
4. We define the loss (14) as a function of error rates using k = 10, picking Λ to equate the true
positive rates across groups. We minimize that loss in the feasible region using the cvxpy
convex optimization library. We directly report the losses corresponding to the optima found
by our procedure. Our comparisons correspond to removing
(a) the calibration compatibility constraints,
(b) the calibration compatibility constraints and the equal opportunity constraint
(c) both constraints, as well as omitting sensitive features from estimation of p∗.
5. Then we use our post-processing method to back out the most informative score pˆ that
produces the optimal error rates. In particular, we compute the transformation kernel T using
the cvxpy convex optimization library. Next we output post-processed scores by randomly
mapping individuals’ original scores given by p∗ to new scores pˆ with probabilities specified
by the kernel T .
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Figure A.5: Credit lending score comparisons. The top-most plots depict the distribution of scores
in the less-educated group (inputted p∗ on the left and outputted pˆ on the right). The middle plots
depict the distribution of scores in the high-educated group (inputted p∗ on the left and outputted pˆ
on the right). The bottom plots depict how the post-processing procedure assigns probability masses
from the inputted score (horizontal axis) to the outputted score (vertical axis), with the less-educated
group’s transformation depicted to the left and the high-educated group’s transformation depicted to
the right.
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Finally, we evaluate our performance by inspecting the calibration of the output score and computing
MSEs, error rates, and the decision-maker’s loss. All losses we report are computed as a function of
error rates, according to
E`(yˆ, Y ) = E[k1{yˆ > Y }+ 1{yˆ < Y }]
= kP(Y = 0)P(yˆ = 1|Y = 0) + P(Y = 1)P(yˆ = 0|Y = 1).
We simply replace the conditional probabilities by empirical averages from the test dataset. For the
MSE of a risk score pˆ, we report En[(Y − pˆ)2] as is standard. Although not reported in the table, the
standard deviation of the MSE of our (randomized) post-processed scores from 100 repetitions is
0.0001.
To assess the extent to which our post-processing preserves calibration, in Figure A.4 we plotted
score bins on the horizontal axis and the average outcomes within each bin along the vertical axis.
Error bars depict the standard error of the mean estimate within each bin.
We can also study how the post-processing transforms the most accurate estimates of p∗ to the
outputted scores pˆ that satisfy the fairness criteria, Figure A.5 depicts in detail how the post-processing
procedure shifts the original distribution of scores.
Appendix for Section 4: Criminal Justice
Raw data and cleaning
The second example in our paper shows that our procedure can modify existing risk assessments to
output calibrated scores and corresponding binary summaries satisfying equal error rates. We used
the Broward County dataset of COMPAS risk scores made available by ProPublica. 2
Motivated by ProPublica’s analysis, we chose as our outcome the variable “two year recid” and
supposed that COMPAS scores from 1-4 are classified as low risk while those from 5-10 are classified
as high risk. We also considered only defendants labelled as white and black (40% and 60%
respectively from a total sample of 6,150). Their recidivism rates vary. A percentage 51% of black
defendants recidivated within two years, compared to 39% of the white defendants.
We define a positive label Y = 1 as not recidivating within two years, and otherwise assign label
Y = 0. Defined as such, the white defendants in the dataset have a higher base rate than the black
defendants.
Deriving our empirical results
Our results followed these steps.
1. We divide all defendants’ given decile scores by 10 so they lie between 0 and 1.
2. Next we calibrate the group-specific scores by replacing each with the average outcome of
individuals assigned that score.
3. We use the calibrated discrete scores to compute group-specific ROC curves using the
scikitlearn.metrics.roc curve function.
4. Then we back out the effective k and p¯ that serve as inputs to the calibration compatibility
constraint and the loss function. In particular, we wish to maintain the same effective risk
cutoff in our post-processing as used in the ProPublica analysis on original COMPAS scores.
Therefore for our purposes we define the cutoff p¯ to be the minimum score (after calibration)
that was classified in the ProPublica analysis as “high.” Along with the group base rates,
this determines the calibration compatibility constraints that combined with our ROC curves
give the feasible region. Given the corresponding k, we define the loss function and find the
optimal target rates in that region.
5. We use our risk score optimization method to back out the most informative scores that
produce the target error rates. In particular, we compute the transformation kernel T using
the cvxpy convex optimization library. Then we output post-processed scores by randomly
2The file “compas-scores-two-years.csv” is available at https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis
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Figure A.6: Criminal justice score comparisons. Recall that we defined the scores to signify
probabilities of not recidivating. The top-most plots depict the distribution of scores among black
defendants in the dataset (inputted p∗ on the left and outputted pˆ on the right). The middle plots depict
the distribution of scores among white defendants in the dataset (inputted p∗ on the left and outputted
pˆ on the right). The bottom plots depict how the post-processing procedure assigns probability
masses from the inputted score (horizontal axis) to the outputted score (vertical axis), with the black
defendants’ transformation kernel depicted to the left and the white defendants’ transformation kernel
depicted to the right.
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mapping individuals’ original scores given by p∗ to new scores pˆ with probabilities specified
by the kernel T .
Finally, we plot the error rates that our post-processing achieves and compare them to the disparate
rates found by ProPublica. We also produce a calibration plot showing that our procedure preserves
predictive parity of the scores. To supplement the plots from the paper, Figure A.6 depicts how the
post-processing procedure shifts the original distribution of scores to achieve the fairness criteria.
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